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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the 
Utah Code Annotated and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 
ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to Butterfield Ford's negligence in selling the fifteen-passenger van in 
question and in not warning the plaintiffs employer of the van's propensity to roll over? 
This issue was raised in the plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Butterfield 
Ford's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Record ("R.") 207-16), at the hearing 
on Butterfield Ford's renewed motion for summary judgment (R. 335, at 32-34, 43-44), 
and at the hearing on the form of the order (R. 335, at 46). 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that a so-called passive retailer who 
sells a defective product that injures a user cannot be liable in strict products liability 
under the Utah Liability Reform Act? 
This issue was raised in the plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Butterfield 
Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 77-83), at the hearing on that motion (R. 335, 
at 15-19), in the plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Butterfield Ford's Renewed 
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Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 216-21), and at the hearing on that motion (R. 335, at 
34-38, 43-44). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a question of law, 
which this court reviews for correctness. E.g., WebBankv. American Gen. Annuity Serv. 
Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^ 10, 54 P.3d 1139. The court determines only whether the trial court 
correctly held that there were no genuine issues of material fact and whether it correctly 
applied the governing law. See id. It accords no deference to the trial court's conclusions 
on these issues. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the first issue on appeal. 
Sections 78-27-37(2) & -38(2) of the Utah Code Annotated are determinative of the 
second issue on appeal. These provisions are set out in the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
This is a products liability action. The plaintiff, Barry Sanns, was seriously injured 
when the fifteen-passenger Ford Econoline E350 van he was riding in rolled over. He 
brought this action against Ford Motor Company and against Butterfield Ford, the 
company that sold the van to Mr. Sanns's employer, the State of Utah, alleging claims for 
strict liability, breach of warranty and negligence. (R. 1-7.) 
Butterfield Ford moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was a "purely 
passive distributor" of the allegedly defective product and that therefore no fault could be 
assessed against it under the Utah Liability Reform Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 
through -43. (R. 30.) It supported its motion with the Affidavit of Brent E. Butterfield, 
the president of Butterfield Ford. (R. 43-45.) 
The trial court initially denied Butterfield Ford's motion for summary judgment 
without prejudice to allow Mr. Sanns to conduct discovery to test Butterfield Ford's claim 
that it was a purely passive distributor but indicated that it would grant the motion if Mr. 
Sanns could not controvert the allegations in Mr. Butterfield's affidavit. (R. 115, 121-
22.) 
After Mr. Sanns deposed Mr. Butterfield, Butterfield Ford renewed its motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 204.) Mr. Sanns opposed the motion on two grounds. First, Mr. 
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Sanns claimed that there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that Butterfield 
Ford was negligent. (R. 215-16.) Second, Mr. Sanns claimed that a passive retailer can 
be strictly liable under Utah law and thus at "fault" within the meaning of the Liability 
Reform Act, regardless of negligence. (R. 216-21.) 
On June 2, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting Butterfield Ford's 
renewed motion for summary judgment. (R. 326.) (A copy of the trial court's order is 
included in the addendum.) The trial court held, among other things, that the plaintiff had 
failed to present any credible evidence that Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive 
distributor of the van. (R. 327, ^ 1.) The court further held: 
The Utah Liability Reform Act. . . does not provide a cause of 
action for strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault 
complained of arises out of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the 
manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the action. Under 
these circumstances no fault can be apportioned] to the passive distributor 
since it was not involved in the design and manufacture of the product. . . . 
(R. 327, ^ 3.) The trial court certified its judgment as to Butterfield Ford as final under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) (R. 327-28), and Mr. Sanns appealed that ruling (R. 
312-13). 
B. Statement of Facts 
The plaintiff, Barry Sanns, was a guard for the State of Utah Department of 
Corrections. On December 7, 2000, he was helping to transport prisoners in a fifteen-
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passenger Ford Econoline E350 van when the van rolled over several times, seriously 
injuring Mr. Sanns and other occupants. (See R. 3; 335, at 3-4.) 
The van was designed and manufactured by defendant Ford Motor Company 
("Ford")- It was then delivered to defendant Butterfield Ford, the appellee, which sold 
the van to the State of Utah, Mr. Sanns's employer. (See R. 33.) 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Butterfield Ford submitted an 
affidavit from its president, Brent Butterfield, claiming that Butterfield Ford did not 
participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, testing or assembly of the van and did 
not prepare any warnings, labeling or instructions associated with the van. (R. 43-45.) 
Mr. Sanns opposed Butterfield Ford's initial motion in part on the grounds that he 
needed further discovery of Butterfield Ford. (See R. 68-71, 75-77.) The court denied 
the motion to allow Mr. Sanns further discovery. (R. 121-22.) After Mr. Butterfield was 
deposed, Butterfield Ford renewed its motion for summary judgment. In opposition to 
Butterfield Ford's renewed motion, Mr. Sanns submitted evidence that Ford Econoline 
vans have a high roof and a higher center of gravity than other passenger cars and thus 
handle differently than other vehicles. (R. 232-33, 236, 238.) According to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), these factors make a fully loaded 
fifteen-passenger van such as the Econoline E350 harder to handle, and the decrease in 
stability increases the rollover risk by about 40 percent. (See R. 258.) Fifteen-passenger 
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vans with ten or more occupants are three times more likely to roll over than those with 
fewer than ten occupants. (R. 257.) Such vans are involved in a higher number of single-
vehicle accidents involving rollovers than are other passenger vehicles. (R. 259.) Eighty-
one percent of fatalities that occur in fifteen-passenger vans occur in single-vehicle 
rollover accidents like the accident in this case. (R. 260.) From 1990 to 2001, 647 people 
were killed in Econoline rollovers. (See R. 264.) There have been more than seventy 
lawsuits involving Ford E350 vans. (R. 266.) Ford's own tests showed the E350 van was 
''unsafe in handling and stability." (See R. 268.) 
Butterfield Ford has been selling Ford Econoline vans since the 1960s. (R. 231.) 
Brent Butterfield has been involved in the automotive industry since about the 
1940s. (R. 227-28.) He has been an owner of Butterfield Ford since 1982. (R. 228-30.) 
Mr. Butterfield served on an advisory council with Ford for two years, 2000 and 2001. 
The council discussed some NHTSA inquiries. (R. 241.) 
Butterfield Ford recognizes an obligation on its part to caution customers about 
safety problems with the vehicles they buy (see R. 244-45), and in fact undertakes to 
instruct some purchasers about problems with the vehicles it sells (R. 233). According to 
Mr. Butterfield, if there is a safety problem with the vehicles Butterfield Ford sells, "we 
are responsible, as is the factory . . . , and we would advise according to whatever 
guidelines are set by whomever is in charge . . . ." (R. 245.) 
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Mr. Butterfield was aware that the Ford Econoline E350 van has a high roof and a 
higher center of gravity than other passenger vehicles and thus handles differently. (R. 
232-33, 236, 238, 243.) 
Mr. Butterfield assumed that Butterfield Ford's sales managers know about the 
stability of the Econoline E350 van as compared to the stability of passenger-type 
vehicles. (R. 237.) He could not recall "specific training information or caution" about 
the handling characteristics of Econoline vans until the 1990s, but testified that there is 
now on the visor of the vehicle "a caution about what it is and that it should be driven 
appropriately," and there is a similar "reminder" in the owner's manual. (R. 232.) Mr. 
Butterfield could not say, however, whether Butterfield Ford employees specifically point 
out these cautions to purchasers. (R. 238.) In fact, when asked if Butterfield Ford's 
employees point out the visor warning on Econoline E350 vans when a retail purchaser is 
picking up the van, Mr. Butterfield responded, "Boy, the only straight answer to that has 
got to be probably some yes and probably some no." (R. 239.) 
Mr. Butterfield testified that Butterfield Ford advises retail customers that the 
Econoline E350 van handles differently than another type of vehicle, but it does not 
necessarily advise fleet buyers such as the State of Utah, the buyer of the van in this case. 
(R. 233-34, 243.) 
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When Ford had a problem with Firestone tires, Butterfield Ford retrieved 
information about the problem from the Internet. (R. 241.) However, Mr. Butterfield 
generally does not seek out information available in the press about Ford vehicles. (R. 
246.) Nevertheless, Mr. Butterfield was aware of a press flurry in the late 1990s 
regarding rollovers in Ford sport utility vehicles. (R. 242.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence showed that Butterfield Ford was aware of handling problems with 
the Ford Econoline E350 van and chose to warn some purchasers about the problems but 
not others. There was thus a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford 
was negligent in selling the fifteen-passenger van at issue in this case to Mr. Sanns's 
employer, the State of Utah, without adequately warning of the van's propensity to roll 
over when loaded. (Point I.) 
But even if Butterfield Ford was not negligent in its sale of the van, it can still be 
liable to Mr. Sanns for his injuries under the Utah Liability Reform Act and the doctrine 
of strict products liability. (Point II.) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BUTTERFIELD FORD 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. SANNS'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM. 
Butterfield Ford claimed below that it could not be liable to Mr. Sanns because it 
was not involved in the design, manufacture, assembly, testing, inspection or repair of the 
van that rolled over and injured Mr. Sanns and did not know of the alleged product defect 
(the van's propensity to roll over when loaded with ten or more occupants). The trial 
court agreed and held that Mr. Sanns had "failed to present any credible evidence to show 
that Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive distributor of the vehicle in question." 
(R. 327,1fl.) 
The evidence before the trial court showed that Butterfield Ford acknowledged 
that it has a responsibility to advise its customers of safety problems with the vehicles it 
sells. (R. 244-45.) It also showed that Butterfield Ford was aware that Ford Econoline 
E350 vans handle differently from other vehicles because of their height and higher 
center of gravity. (R. 232-33, 236, 238, 243.) These and other characteristics make the 
vans more difficult to handle and more susceptible to rollovers. (See R. 258.) 
According to the trial court, however: 
The fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged a van has a higher 
center of gravity than a sports car and, as such, handles differently, does not 
create a genuine issue of material fact that the dealer knew or should have 
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known of any alleged design defects. It simply means that vans ride higher 
on the road than sports cars. The Court is not persuaded that this fact 
changes the status of Butterfield Ford to something other than a passive 
distributor. 
(R. 327,1f 2.) 
The evidence, however, showed that fifteen-passenger vans such as the Econoline 
E350 do not "simply . . . ride higher on the road than sports cars" but that they are much 
more susceptible to rollovers than other vehicles, particularly when loaded with ten or 
more occupants. (See R. 257-60, 264, 268.) The danger presented by such vans 
prompted the National Transportation Safety Board to issue a safety recommendation for 
fifteen-passenger vans. (See R. 259.) 
Moreover, the evidence showed that Butterfield Ford undertook to warn some 
purchasers of the vans about the vans' handling problems and greater susceptibility to 
rollovers but did not tell other purchasers, in particular, fleet buyers such as the State of 
Utah, the purchaser of the van that injured Mr. Sanns. (R. 233-34, 239, 243.) 
If Butterfield Ford was not fully aware of the safety problems with the E350 vans 
it sold, it was only because it chose not to become informed. It did not seek out 
information about stability problems with the vans it sold, nor did it try to pass such 
information on to consumers. (See R. 246.) 
A reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that Butterfield Ford knew or 
should have known that the Econoline E350 vans it sold were unreasonably dangerous 
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and much more likely to roll over than other passenger vehicles and that Butterfield Ford 
failed to exercise reasonable care to make sure that users of the vans were aware of the 
problems with the vans. On Butterfield Ford's motion for summary judgment, the trial 
court was required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw 
all reasonable inferences in his favor. E.g., Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 
389 (Utah 1984); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Viewed in this 
light, the evidence presented a jury question on Mr. Sanns's negligence claim against 
Butterfield Ford, and the trial court erred in granting Butterfield Ford's renewed motion 
for summary judgment on that claim. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN GRANTING BUTTERFIELD FORD 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. SANNS'S CLAIM FOR 
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY. 
Even if Butterfield Ford were not negligent as a matter of law, it could still be 
liable to Mr. Sanns in strict products liability. See Siisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, 
f 8, 979 P.2d 317 (it is possible to bring both a negligence and a strict liability claim 
against the same defendant). The trial court, however, held: 
The Utah Liability Reform A c t . . . does not provide a cause of 
action for strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault 
complained of arises out of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the 
manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the action. Under 
11 
these circumstances no fault can be apportioned] to the passive distributor 
since it was not involved in the design and manufacture of the product... . 
(R. 327, H 3.) 
For the reasons stated in point I, supra, the trial court erred in concluding that 
Butterfield Ford was a "purely passive distributor" of a defective product. There was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford was negligent in selling the 
van without adequate warnings regarding its handling and stability problems. The trial 
court also erred, however, in ruling that a "purely passive distributor" of a defective 
product cannot be liable under the Utah Liability Reform Act and that Butterfield Ford 
was therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Sanns's strict products 
liability claim. 
The Liability Reform Act specifically contemplates a cause of action for strict 
products liability against the seller of a defective product, regardless of whether the seller 
is otherwise at "fault." The act provides: "A person seeking recovery [here, Mr. Sanns] 
may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault. . . exceeds the fault 
of the person seeking recovery " UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38(2) (2002). Thus, if 
Butterfield Field is considered at "fault" and its fault, together with that of Ford, exceeds 
that of Mr. Sanns, Mr. Sanns may recover from Butterfield Ford, and Butterfield Ford can 
be liable to Mr. Sanns. 
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"Fault" within the meaning of the Liability Reform Act is broader than the 
traditional concept of "fault." The act defines "fault" as "any actionable breach of legal 
duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained 
by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees,... strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, [and] products liability . . . . " Id. § 
78-27-37(2) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford sound not 
only in negligence but also in strict products liability. Both are encompassed within the 
Liability Reform Act's definition of "fault." The Liability Reform Act does not make any 
exceptions for "purely passive distributors" or non-manufacturing sellers like Butterfield 
Ford. 
The Liability Reform Act does not define "strict liability" or "products liability" 
but leaves the definition of those terms to other law. Similarly, the Utah Product Liability 
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-15-1 through -7, does not define "products liability" or 
"strict liability" but presupposes that a claim for strict products liability exists under Utah 
law.1 Significantly, the Product Liability Act does not immunize so-called passive 
distributors from liability but recognizes that a products liability claim may be brought 
1
 The act establishes a statute of limitations for product liability claims, 
prohibits pleading a specific dollar amount of damages in the complaint, defines "fault" 
within the meaning of the Liability Reform Act to include alteration or modification of a 
product under certain conditions, and creates a rebuttable presumption that a product that 
conforms to government standards is free from defects. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-15-
3, -4, -5 & -6. 
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against a "retailer," such as Butterfield Ford. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-4 (no dollar 
amount can be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed "in a product liability action 
against a product manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer"). 
Thus, to determine whether Mr. Sanns has a claim for strict products liability 
against Butterfield Ford under Utah law, the court must look to the common law. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in Ernest 
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Company, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). It did so in the 
language of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 601 P.2d at 158. Section 
402A states: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1963 & 1964). This rule, which makes "the 
seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all possible 
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care in the preparation and sale of the product, " id. cmt. a (emphasis added), was based 
on the theory that, as between an innocent user of the product and the person who sold the 
product, the one who should bear the loss is the one who created the danger by placing 
the product on the market and who benefited from the sale of the product-that is, the 
seller of the product, in this case, Butterfield Ford. See id. cmt. c; Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 
601 P.2d at 156-57 (citations omitted); Hanover v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 
445 (Utah Ct App. 1988) (citation omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A, cmt./('The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for 
the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying 
human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, 
and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such 
goods"). 
The rule stated in section 402A "applies to any person engaged in the business of 
selling products for use or consumption," including "any wholesale or retail dealer or 
distributor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt./2 
2
 The same rule applies under the new Restatement on products liability: 
"One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or 
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the defect." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 
(1997). The comments to the new Restatement also make it clear that the rule covers 
retailers such as Butterfield Ford: 
The rule stated in this Section provides that all commercial sellers and 
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The Utah Supreme Court has never overruled Hahn, nor has it abandoned the 
doctrine of strict products liability as stated in section 402A. See, e.g., Slisze v. Stanley-
Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, f 8, 979 P.2d 318 (it is possible to simultaneously bring a 
negligence and a strict liability claim). Indeed, Utah appellate courts have continued to 
recognize that non-manufacturing sellers of products are potentially liable for claims 
sounding in products liability, even after enactment of the Liability Reform Act. See, 
e.g., House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a 
summary judgment in favor of a non-manufacturing distributor of a bulletproof vest), 
affd, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). See also Jackson v. Philip Morris Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1229 (D. Utah 1998) ("under Utah strict products liability law, a plaintiff may sue 
the distributor of an unreasonably dangerous product so long as the distributor is 
sufficiently placed within the chain of distribution of the product from the manufacturer 
to the ultimate consumer"). 
For purposes of its renewed motion for summary judgment, Butterfield Ford did 
not dispute that it was engaged in the business of selling Ford Econoline vans (see R. 44, 
distributors of products, including nonmanufacturing sellers and 
distributors such as wholesalers and retailers, are subject to liability for 
selling products that are defective. Liability attaches even when such 
nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors do not themselves render the 
products defective and regardless of whether they are in a position to 
prevent defects from occurring. 
Id. cmt. e (emphasis added). 
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Tf 4; 231); that Ford Econoline vans such as the van at issue in this case were in a 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user; or that the changes the State of 
Utah made in the van in order to use it to transport prisoners did not affect the van's 
stability. Therefore, Mr. Sanns stated a claim against Butterfield Ford for strict products 
liability under section 402A, and Butterfield Ford could be liable for Mr. Sanns's injuries 
even if it had "exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of [its] product." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a). The trial court erred in ruling that 
Butterfield Ford could not be liable to Mr. Sanns as a matter of law. 
Butterfield Ford argued below—and the trial court agreed—that it could not be 
liable to Mr. Sanns under the Liability Reform Act because it was not at "fault" because it 
did not design or manufacture the defective van. (See R. 327, f 3.) But "fault" under the 
Liability Reform Act is broader than traditional notions of fault. It includes strict liability 
and products liability. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2). The seller of a defective 
product can be liable in strict products liability even if the seller's only "fault" was 
placing a defective product into the stream of commerce. See, e.g., Mar con v. Kmart 
Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728, 730-31 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied (Minn. 1998) (strict 
liability could be imposed on a nonmanufacturing seller of a product that was defective 
due to a failure to warn even if the seller was not negligent). Ford, the designer and 
manufacturer of the van, may have been more at fault than Butterfield Ford, the retailer, 
17 
but that does not mean that Butterfield Ford was not also at fault. Ford's fault in 
designing and manufacturing a defective product does not excuse Butterfield Ford's fault 
in selling a defective product. 
Butterfield Ford suggested below that its fault is zero compared to Ford's. (See, 
e.g., R. 335, at 12.) Comparative fault is a question for the jury to decide. Steffensen v. 
Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Utah 1993) (the apportionment of 
negligence is exclusively the jury's responsibility); Little Am. Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 
P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982) (apportionment of fault is a fact question entrusted to the jury). 
This court need not decide at this time how fault should be apportioned between an 
allegedly negligent manufacturer and a so-called passive retailer or distributor. It is 
enough to hold that Butterfield Ford has at least some "fault" under Utah law by virtue of 
having sold a defective product. 
Nevertheless, other authorities that have considered the issue have concluded that 
the liability of a passive retailer in a case like this is a form of vicarious liability and that 
the retailer and manufacturer should therefore be treated as a single unit for 
apportionment of fault; to the extent the retailer is held liable for the harm caused by the 
defective product, it may have a claim for indemnity against the manufacturer. See, e.g., 
Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 590, 593-94 (Cal. Ct. 
App.), review denied (Cal. 1998); Wimberlyv. Derby Cycle Corp., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 
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536-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 432-33 
(Term. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 7 cmt. 
j ; § 13 & cmts. a & d (1999). See also Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 
443, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (an innocent or passive retailer who is claimed to be 
strictly liable for the plaintiffs injuries may be entitled to indemnity from the negligent 
manufacturer) (decided under the law as it existed before passage of the Liability Reform 
Act). Cf Owens, 915 S.W.2d at 434 ("there can be no claim for indemnification based on 
active-passive negligence because that distinction is subsumed into the doctrine of 
comparative fault"; however, "where implied indemnity is based on the legal relationship 
between the parties, the traditional principles of indemnity continue to apply"). See 
generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Products Liability: Seller's Right to Indemnity 
from Manufacturer, 79 A.L.R. 4TH 278 (1990). 
Strict products liability is a joint tort in the original sense of the word. All the 
defendants in the stream of commerce act in concert to see that the product reaches the 
ultimate user or consumer. Under traditional principles of tort law, joint tortfeasors (i.e., 
those liable for a joint tort) could all be liable for all of the plaintiffs injuries, under the 
theory that the act of one was the act of all. See American Motorcycle Ass 'n v. Superior 
Court, 578 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1978); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 46, at 291 (4th ed. 1971). 
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This approach makes sense, since, in the case of strict products liability, the "fault" 
is really with the product, and all those in the chain of distribution are equally at fault for 
placing a defective product in the stream of commerce. See Owens, 915 S.W.2d at 433. 
Cf. Arena, 1A Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593 ("we focus on the instrumentality causing the harm 
rather than solely on the status of the defendant"). 
But the court need not decide this issue at this time. The issue will not be ripe 
until a jury holds Butterfield Ford liable for all or part of Mr. Sanns's claims. The only 
issue this court need decide is whether the Liability Reform Act did away with a claim of 
strict products liability against a retailer such as Butterfield Ford. By the plain terms of 
the act, it did not, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. The court should remand 
this case so that a jury may consider Mr. Sanns's strict liability claim against Butterfield 
Ford. 
CONCLUSION 
In granting summary judgment to Butterfield Ford, the trial court erroneously ruled 
that Butterfield Ford could not be liable to Mr. Sanns because, under the Liability Reform 
Act, no fault can be assessed against a purely passive distributor. 
For the reasons stated in point I, supra, the trial court erred in concluding that 
Butterfield Ford was a "purely passive" distributor; Butterfield Ford was at least negligent 
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in putting into the stream of commerce a product it knew or should have known was 
highly susceptible to rollover accidents and in failing to adequately warn users of the van 
of its handling and stability problems. 
But even if Butterfield Ford were simply a "passive distributor" of the van, it can 
still be liable to Mr. Sanns for strict products liability. As explained in point II, supra, the 
Liability Reform Act did not do away with the strict liability of non-manufacturing 
distributers of products under Utah law. Mr. Butterfield himself recognized as much 
when he testified that, if there is a safety problem with the vehicles Butterfield Ford sells, 
'Sve are responsible, as is the factory . . . ." (R. 245.) 
The application of the Liability Reform Act in this case may raise other issues, 
such as how the fault of a manufacturer and retailer are to be compared and whether a 
retailer who is required to pay damages to an injured party has a claim for indemnity 
against the manufacturer, but this court does not have to reach those issues at this time. It 
is enough to hold that Butterfield Ford's conduct in placing a defective product into the 
stream of commerce falls squarely within the Liability Reform Act's definition of "fault" 
and that Butterfield Ford can therefore be liable to Mr. Sanns in strict products liability. 
The court should therefore reverse the trial court's ruling granting summary 
judgment to Butterfield Ford and remand this case for further proceedings against 
Butterfield Ford. 
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DATED this 2nd day of October, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit as defined 
in Subsection (3), who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. 
(2) "Fault"' means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking 
recovery, including negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of 
risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, 
and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act, or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit 
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act 
as legal representative. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of 
defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds 
the fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made under 
Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess 
of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-27-39. 
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable to each defendant, the 
fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any 
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of whether the person is a 
person immune from suit or a defendant in the action and may allocate fault to 
each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any other person whether 
joined as a party to the action or not and whose identity is known or unknown to 
the parties to the action, including a person immune from suit who contributed to 
the alleged injury. In the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an 
unidentified motor vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence which may consist solely of one person's testimony. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only to 
accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant and 
may not subject the person immune from suit to any liability, based on the 
allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
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Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 
Brian C. Cheney (8881) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendants Ford Motor Company and 
Butterfield Ford 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARRY SANNS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware 
Corporation; BUTTERFIELD FORD, a 
Utah Corporation; and DOES 1 THROUGH 
30, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING BUTTERFIELD 
FORD'S RENEWED MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020904820 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendant Butterfield Ford's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment ("Renewed 
Motion") came before this Court for oral argument on May 20, 2003. The Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod presided. Plaintiff was represented by David R. Olsen and Paul M. Simmons. Defendant 
Butterfield Ford was represented by Bryon J. Benevento and Brian C. Cheney. The Court noted 
that it had previously granted Plaintiff additional time to conduct discovery in order to oppose 
Defendant Butterfield Ford's initial Motion for Summary Judgment that was filed on December 
13, 2002. After reviewing the Renewed Motion, the opposing and supporting memoranda, the 
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Affidavit of Brent Butterfield, the deposition testimony and other documentary exhibits, and 
having heard oral argument of counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
Findings 
1. Plaintiff failed to present any credible evidence to show that Butterfield Ford was 
anything but a passive distributor of the vehicle in question. Butterfield Ford did not design, 
manufacture, test, assemble, package or ship the vehicle. It did not modify, alter or change the 
vehicle in any manner. Instead, it simply sold the vehicle to the State of Utah as part of a fleet 
transaction in the same condition as the vehicle was received from Ford Motor Company. 
2. The fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged a van has a higher center of gravity 
than a sports car and, as such, handles differently, does not create a genuine issue of material fact 
that the dealer knew or should have known of any alleged design defects. It simply means that 
vans ride higher on the road than sports cars. The Court is not persuaded that this fact changes the 
status of Butterfield Ford to something other than a passive distributor of the vehicle. 
3. The Utah Liability Reform Act ("Act") does not provide a cause of action for strict 
liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault complained of arises out of a design or 
manufacturing defect, and where the manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the 
action. Under these circumstances no fault can be apportion to the passive distributor since it was 
not involved in the design and manufacture of the product. To hold otherwise would render the 
apportionment of fault a legal fiction since fault presupposes some breach of duty or culpable act 
of commission or omission that cannot exist in a case of a purely passive distributor. It would also 
reinstate the concept of joint and several liability which has been expressly abrogated by the Act. 
Order 
Based upon the forgoing, it is hereby ordered that Defendant Butterfield Ford's Renewed 
Motion is granted, and Plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford are dismissed with prejudice. 
The Court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and therefore directs 
that this order be entered as a final judgment as to defendant Butterfield Ford under Utah Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 54(b). 
DATED this _ > _ day of June, 2003. 
By the Court 
Judge Stephen L^Peikj6d 
Third Judicial District'Court Judge 
**•«. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David R. Olsen 
Paul M. Simmons 
Dewsnup, King & pisen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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